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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Erik Sherman Trenkle and his significant other, Misty Bacus, were involved in a
physical altercation that took place in the presence of their minor son, K.T. After a
mistrial in his first trial and a hung jury in his second trial, the jury in his third trial found
Mr. Trenkle guilty of felony domestic violence in the presence of a child. Mr. Trenkle
appealed, asserting the district court erred when it denied his request for a defense of
property jury instruction.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court correctly determined
the evidence did not support a defense of property instruction, and any error in not
giving a defense of property instruction was harmless. (Resp. Br., pp.3-10.) This Reply
Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which are unavailing.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Trenkle’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Trenkle’s request for an I.C.J.I. 1522
defense of property jury instruction?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Trenkle’s Request For An I.C.J.I. 1522
Defense Of Property Jury Instruction
A.

Introduction
Idaho law recognizes that, to prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure

property, the person who lawfully possesses the property may use resistance sufficient
to prevent the offense from occurring.

See State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877

(Ct. App. 2005) (citing I.C. § 19-202). Mr. Trenkle asserts a reasonable jury could
conclude from the evidence presented that Ms. Bacus was attempting to injure his cell
phone, and that he made contact with Ms. Bacus’ forehead while using resistance
sufficient to prevent that injury to his property from occurring. Cf. Walsh, 141 Idaho at
877. Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, the district court erred when it denied
Mr. Trenkle’s request for an I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property jury instruction. Further,
the State has failed to prove the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Trenkle’s Request For An I.C.J.I.
1522 Defense Of Property Jury Instruction
Mr. Trenkle asserts the district court erred when it denied his request for a

defense of property jury instruction. The requested instruction was a correct statement
of the law and was not adequately covered by other instructions. Further, the evidence
presented supported the requested instruction. Thus, the district court should have
honored Mr. Trenkle’s request for a defense of property jury instruction. See State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710-11 (2009).
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In the Respondent’s Brief, the State has only offered argument disputing whether
the evidence presented supported the requested instruction. (See Resp. Br., pp.3-9.)
As a preliminary matter, the State appears to be confused about the scope of
Mr. Trenkle’s assertions regarding the evidence in support of the defense of property
jury instruction.

Mr. Trenkle has asserted the evidence presented supported a

conclusion by the jury that Ms. Bacus was making an illegal attempt by force to injure
Mr. Trenkle’s property, and in response Mr. Trenkle used reasonable resistance
sufficient to prevent the offense that was about to occur. (See App. Br., pp.13-14; Trial
Tr., p.268, L.22 – p.269, L.3 (trial counsel asserting Ms. Bacus testified that Mr. Trenkle
grabbed her “to get the cellphone.”).) Thus, to the extent the State’s arguments concern
whether the evidence supported a conclusion that Mr. Trenkle used reasonable
resistance to prevent Ms. Bacus’ illegal attempt by force to take, as opposed to injure,
Mr. Trenkle’s property (see Resp. Br., pp.6, 8), those arguments may be disregarded by
the Court.
The State argues Mr. Trenkle’s “use of force was also not ‘reasonably necessary
to prevent the threatened injury’ to his cellphone.” (Resp. Br., p.7.) According to the
State, Mr. Trenkle could have simply left to prevent Ms. Bacus from throwing the phone,
and it was not reasonably necessary for him to grab Ms. Bacus around the neck or
knock her out. (Resp. Br., p.7.) This argument by the State improperly invites the Court
to decide the legal issue on appeal based on questions of fact and thus invade the
province of the jury. Whether Mr. Trenkle’s use of force when Ms. Bacus attempted to
throw the phone was unreasonable, and whether his use of force when she no longer
had the phone was unreasonable, “are questions of fact which, in a jury trial, are within
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the province of the jury.” See State v. Garner, 159 Idaho 896, ___, 367 P.3d 720, 724
(Ct. App. 2016) (holding, on whether the evidence supported an I.C.J.I. 1263 jury
instruction on self-defense with respect to officers, that “[w]hether the officers’ use of
force was excessive and whether [the defendant’s] responding force was unreasonable
are questions of fact which, in a jury trial, are within the province of the jury.”). Like the
Idaho Court of Appeals did in Garner, this Court should reject the State’s invitation to
“weigh the evidence.” See id., 367 P.3d at 724.
Contrary to the State’s argument, the “primary issue here is whether there was
some evidence to support” Mr. Trenkle’s requested defense of property jury instruction.
See id., 367 P.3d at 724. Based on Ms. Bacus’ testimony (see Trial Tr., p.147, L.8 –
p.148, L.9, p.197, L.25 – p.198, L.7, p.204, L.10 – p.206, L.1), a reasonable jury could
have concluded that Ms. Bacus was threatening to injure Mr. Trenkle’s cell phone by
throwing it out the door, and that Mr. Trenkle’s actions were a reasonable response to
that potential imminent injury. Because of the lack of testimony on how much time
elapsed between Ms. Bacus dropping the phone and Mr. Trenkle making contact with
Ms. Bacus’ forehead (see Trial Tr., p.148, Ls.10-18, p.150, L.15 – p.152, L.6, p.207,
L.21 – p.210, L.20), the jury could have concluded Mr. Trenkle contacted Ms. Bacus’
forehead immediately after she dropped the phone and did not hear her announce she
dropped the phone. Thus, the evidence presented supported Mr. Trenkle’s requested
defense of property jury instruction, and Mr. Trenkle was entitled to such an instruction.
The State attempts to argue its conclusion that Mr. Trenkle was not entitled to a
defense of property instruction “is consistent with the Court of Appeals’ opinion in
State v. Walsh, [141 Idaho 870] (Ct. App. 2005)” (Resp. Br., p.7), but the facts in Walsh
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are readily distinguishable from those in this case. In Walsh, the victim hid a box of
documents from the defendant, and the defendant contended he pushed the victim to
remove her from his path so he could look for the documents. Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877.
On appeal, the defendant asserted the magistrate erred by refusing his requested
defense of property instruction, and the Idaho Court of Appeals held the evidence did
not support the legal theory of defense of property. Id. at 876-77. The Walsh Court
observed “no evidence suggests that there was an imminent threat that the victim would
destroy the documents, which could justify resistance to prevent such injury.” Id. at 877.
Conversely, as the State acknowledges (see Resp. Br., pp.5-6), in the instant
case Ms. Bacus testified that she told Mr. Trenkle she would grab his cell phone and
throw it out the door if he did not leave, and she then grabbed the phone, ran to the
front door, and tried to throw the phone out the door. (See Trial Tr., p.147, L.14 –
p.148, L.1.) Thus, unlike the evidence in Walsh, the evidence in this case suggested
there was an imminent threat that Ms. Bacus would injure the phone, which could justify
Mr. Trenkle’s resistance to prevent such injury. Cf. Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877. Walsh
does not support the State’s argument, because the facts in that case are readily
distinguishable from the facts here.
The evidence presented supported Mr. Trenkle’s requested I.C.J.I. 1522 defense
of property jury instruction. The district court erred when it denied his request for a
defense of property instruction. As shown above, the State’s arguments to the contrary
are unavailing.
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C.

The State Has Failed To Prove That The District Court’s Failure To Give
Mr. Trenkle’s Requested Defense Of Property Jury Instruction Is Harmless
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Trenkle asserts the State has failed to prove that the district court’s failure to

give his requested instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
Mr. Trenkle would first note the State urges the Court to use the wrong harmless
error standard in this case. The State contends “[a]n instructional error is harmless
where it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the
defendant guilty absent the error.’” (Resp. Br., p.9 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 18 (1999)). But the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that “[w]here the jury
reached its verdict based upon erroneous instruction an appellate court shall generally
vacate and remand the decision of the lower court.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The Perry
Court continued: “However, in the limited instance where the jury received proper
instruction on all but one element of an offense, and ‘[w]here a reviewing court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and
supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the
same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79 (2004)).
Mr. Trenkle’s case does not involve the “limited instance” from Perry. In the
present case, the jury instructions did not omit an element of an offense, but rather the
jury did not receive proper instruction on a defense. (See, e.g., App. Br., pp.10-14.)
Thus, the harmless error standard invoked by the State is not applicable here. See
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. The State in this case “has the burden of demonstrating to the

7

appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict.” See id. at 227-28. Put otherwise, the issue “is not what
effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable
jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” See
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993).
The State argues the Court “can easily conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that, had the jury been given the defense of property instruction, it still would have
found” Mr. Trenkle guilty because his acts “were not reasonably necessary to prevent
the threatened harm to his cellphone.” (Resp. Br., p.9.) This argument by the State is
unavailing because it uses the wrong harmless error standard and, for the reasons set
forth in Part B. above, improperly invites the Court to invade the province of the jury.
The State additionally argues it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have found Mr. Trenkle guilty absent the error because Mr. Trenkle’s conduct
after the incident “revealed that his violent acts were not to protect his phone, but were
the result of rage.” (See Resp. Br., p.9.) This argument also fails because it uses the
wrong harmless error standard.
Further, the defense of property jury instruction provides, as the State recognizes
(see Resp. Br., p.4), that “[r]easonableness is to be judged from the viewpoint of a
reasonable person placed in the same position and seeing and knowing what the
defendant then saw and knew.” I.C.J.I. 1522; cf. State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 670
(Ct. App. 1986) (“We conclude that any threat to Mason had subsided when Stapleton
left his presence. Thus, Mason was not ‘about to be injured’ and lawful resistance was
unnecessary.”). The jury therefore could have found that any battery committed by
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Mr. Trenkle was, at the time, “reasonably necessary to prevent the threatened injury”
based on “the viewpoint of a reasonable person placed in the same position and seeing
and knowing what [Mr. Trenkle] then saw and knew,” irrespective of Mr. Trenkle’s future
conduct.1 See I.C.J.I. 1522.
The State has failed to prove that the district court’s failure to give his requested
instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Thus,
Mr. Trenkle’s conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded for a new
trial. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472 (2012).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Trenkle respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand his case
to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 24th day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

For example, the court minutes for Day 3 of Mr. Trenkle’s second trial state the jury
was given the full I.C.J.I. 1522 defense of property jury instruction in response to a jury
question. (R., p.199.) After the jury received the defense of property instruction, it was
unable to reach a verdict. (R., p.199.)
Mr. Trenkle asserts the result of the second trial indicates at least one juror in
that trial was concerned whether Mr. Trenkle’s actions were justifiable as defense of
property. Cf. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, ___, 342 P.3d 628, 631-32 (2015)
(holding the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the
constitutional error in excluding proffered evidence that would have corroborated the
defendant’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdict, where a jury question “indicates
that at least one juror was concerned whether there was any evidence to corroborate
Defendant’s testimony.”)
1
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